Debating The Motion To Suspend Gobind

The tabling of the motion to suspend Gobind Singh from Parliament for a year by Datuk Seri Nazri Aziz is intriguing.

The motion reads as follows (taken from YB Lim Kit Siang’s blog):

ATURAN URUSAN MESYUARAT DAN USUL-USUL

Menteri di Jabatan Perdana Menteri akan mencadangkan:

BAHAWA pada 12 Mac 2009, Yang Berhormat Tuan Gobind Singh Deo, Ahli Parlimen kawasan Puchong semasa perbahasan peringkat Jawatankuasa Rang Undang-undang Perbekalan Tambahan (2009) 2009 telah mengeluarkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang mendakwa YAB. Timbalan Perdana Menteri, Ahli Parlimen Kawasan Pekan terlibat dalam kes pembunuhan.

BAHAWA Yang Berhormat Ahli Parlimen Kawasan Puchong juga telah mengeluarkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang menghina Timbalan Yang di-Pertua Dewan Rakyat setelah diperintah keluar Dewan.

DAN BAHAWA kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat oleh Yang Berhormat Ahli Parlimen Kawasan Puchong adalah merupakan satu dakwaan yang sangat serius dan menyalahi hak dan keistimewaan sebagai Ahli Parlimen serta merupakan satu penghinaan kepada Dewan ini.

MAKA INILAH DIPERSETUJUI BAHAWA Yang Berhormat Ahli Parlimen Kawasan Puchong hendaklah digantung tugas dari jawatannya sebagai Ahli Parlimen selama dua belas (12) bulan dari tarikh keputusan usul ini diluluskan. Dalam masa penggantungan ini Yang Berhormat Ahli Parlimen Kawasan Puchong tidak akan dibayar kesemua bayaran elaun dan kemudahan sebagai seorang Ahli Parlimen.

It appears that the motion is grounded on Gobind having abused parliamentary process and privilege in accusing the Deputy Prime Minister of being involved in the murder of Altantuya Shaaribuu.

Leaving aside the questions of whether the matter ought more properly be taken up before the Committee of Privileges and whether the suspension of the Puchong MP for a day on 12th March brought the matter to a close, it is significant that a debate of the motion must necessarily involve discussion of whether Gobind Singh had conducted himself inappropriately.

This would necessarily involve a consideration of whether the making of the accusation was warranted which in turn would involve a consideration of the very matters that the Deputy Speaker had directed Gobind Singh not to speak about on the basis that the matters were “sub-judice”.

If the sub-judice ruling holds, then the motion cannot be debated.

The motion is of punitive nature, it aims at suspending Gobind Singh without allowances and privileges. The MP must therefore be given every opportunity to state his position squarely. Additionally, all other MPs must be given an opportunity to debate the motion fully in order that the issue is fully ventilated. As such, the Speaker cannot limit the scope of debate by ruling that reference to the Altantuya case and its investigation is not permitted. This would be akin to the MP being asked to step into a boxing ring with his hands tied behind him.

If the Speaker allows full ventilation of the issue, it would not only be inconsistent with the ruling of the Deputy Speaker on 12th March and other prior rulings that have impeded the raising of the Altantuya matter in Parliament, it would also permit the Altantuya matter to be raised in Parliament.

I am not certain who stands to lose more if the motion is permitted to be debated.

MIS

Assault On Legislature, Constitution Dead

Discussing the Perak situation with specificity is, by this stage, a difficult thing to do. So much has happened so quickly. Nuanced actions and counter-actions, some of it in uncertain legal terrain, and relatively scarce details have made it precarious to consider certain key events – the legal action against the Speaker and its incidents, for instance – with the depth that only certainty would allow for.

Having said that, whatever the specifics may be and whoever may be right as to the validity or legality of certain aspects of the unfolding saga, when considered from a broader perspective and with reference to the fundamentals of democracy, I do not think that the situation in Perak is very complicated at all. As Tengku Razaleigh recently observed, a chain-reaction of illegality has left Perak possibly without a legitimate government and the Constitution a dead piece of paper.

I was too young to fully appreciate the terrible impact on democracy that the events of 1987 and 1988 had. Understanding came later, as I learnt to see what needed to be seen: the supremacy of the Constitution, the separation of powers and the check and balance it is aimed at, the independence of the judiciary and, correspondingly, the legislature. But even as my awareness of what had happened and how it had happened increased, I rather naively found myself thinking that it was unlikely that we would ever see anything of the likes again. Those events had simply been too heinous and the injuries inflicted on this nation too serious to ignore, even by those who had been responsible and those who would possibly follow in their footsteps.

Or so I thought.

The savagery of what has happened in Perak and the utter disregard of consequence on the part of those orchestrating the campaign go far to show how foolish I was to have believed that all of us, without exception, recognize that some costs are too great and for that, even blind ambition has its limits. It is clear now that this is not necessarily the case; for some, even the nation itself is expendable.

In saying savagery, I recognize that there has been neither bloodshed nor preventive detentions, though it is still too early to say for sure that things will stay that way. The incitement carries on, and mobs are being driven to frenzy to the throb of the war drums. Amidst the calls for blood, bullets have been sent, a disabled parliamentarian assaulted and some of his colleagues battered. The police have apparently too much on their hands to move with the speed that they are capable of and, as such, as things stand serve no useful role as the deterrent that the situation sorely requires.

Violence has however been done; to the Federal and State constitutions, to the Rule of Law and to all that these fundamentals represent. War has been waged on democracy itself.

I can think of no other way to characterize events.

As thing stands, the Speaker is still the Speaker. He has been at all times vested with the full powers of his office and the discretion to exercise those powers. He may have committed mistakes in arriving at certain decisions, but those are matters for the Legislative Assembly itself or, where legal limits have been transgressed, for the courts whose powers in this regard are limited by reason of the separation of powers. Until corrected, the Speaker’s decisions stand, be they the acceptance of the resignation of the three members who crossed the floor, the issuing of the show cause notices to the alleged usurpers of power and the effecting of their suspension, or the calling of the emergency sessions of the Assembly.

And yet under the hand of the Executive, in a manner reminiscent of the locking up of the Supreme Court in 1988 the Legislative Assembly itself was put out of bounds to members of the Assembly, This was done at the instigation of the State Secretary, an officer of the executive and as such its representative, with the assistance of a police force duty bound to protect the system of governance and associated freedoms put in place by the constitutions of this nation.

In doing so, the Executive laid siege on the Legislature. The sight of the Federal Reserve Unit barring the way into the Legislative Assembly, fangs bared and water cannon poised, was as close a physical depiction of democracy being taken hostage as we will ever see. The underlying intention of the exercise brings this further into relief. It was apparent that the Assembly had to be prevented from meeting for as long as it took for the lawyers to do what they could in court. Injunctions against the Speaker had been applied for. Once these were granted, the process that the Speaker had started would be brought to a halt.

The fact that the injunctions had been applied for shows clearly how far democracy was subverted. The making of the applications underscores awareness on the part of those orchestrating the campaign that self-help was not permissible. The validity of the Speaker’s actions had to be tested before a court of law. If they were not needed, the injunctions would not have been sought.

Despite this appreciation of the obvious, the might of the state was brought to bear. A federal agency was brought in and tasked to do what it was not mandated by law to do: keep the Assembly at bay to protect the interest of a coalition of political parties.

There is no law that allows police officers to deny members of a legislative chamber access to that chamber for the business of Legislature. It is not for any police officer to unilaterally determine that the business being conducted is not within the ambit of the legislature, no matter who might say it is. What the police force did was not justified in law. No crime had been committed. Though the gathering masses was reason enough for a police presence, breaches of the peace did not occur nor were orders to disperse issued, unsurprising given that the focal point was the denial of access to the Legislative Assembly.

It is glaringly obvious that confronted with a scenario that left it vulnerable to a tactical maneuvering of legislative procedure, and an inability to resolve the imbroglio to advantage, the Barisan Nasional at the state and federal level collectively took the law into its own hands. The plan to capture Perak had run into a brick wall and rather than go around it, they decided to blow it up and everything else with it.

The situation is comparable to a hypothetical scenario in which Pakatan Rakyat Members of Parliament barricaded Parliament House to deny Barisan Nasional Members and the Speaker access so as to prevent them from legitimately making a law that they would otherwise have. The only difference is if that had occurred, the Barisan Nasional would have denounced the exercise as an attempted coup d’etat and punished those involved to the full extent of the law at its disposal.

It does not make any difference that that the Barisan Nasional forms the Federal government of the day and is in a position to direct the police force; like all other institutions, these institutions are bound to act constitutionally and in accordance with the law. Malaysia is still a democracy predicated on constitutional supremacy. The expectation that all affairs will be conducted to the exclusive convenience and the advantage of the Barisan Nasional and its leaders is more suited to a dictatorship in which the Rule of Law means nothing.

Through the last week Malaysians have borne witness to a shameless display of belligerence and arrogance. We have heard a senior minister describe the emergency session, held by necessity under that now immortalized rain-tree, as “uncivilized”. Another senior minister described the Speaker as a ‘boy’. Though in line with the other ridiculous observations of ambitious UMNO leaders that Malaysians have had to endure since the beginning of the Perak affair, they do little to mask the obvious; that the Barisan Nasional appears to see no limits to what it is permitted to do to achieve its objectives.

And if it could do this in one state, what is to stop it from acting in the same way in other states or at the federal level. Judging by the way in which it has responded to criticism over its actions these past few weeks, it would seem nothing much. It is manifest that the Barisan Nasional considers itself a law unto itself.

That is the painful truth that lies at the heart of Tengku Razaleigh’s declaration that the Constitution is dead.

(Malaysian Insider; 6th March 2009)

MIS

Striking A Pose

Striking A Pose (Of Crime And Punishment)

THE recent ruling by the National Fatwa Council on yoga has resulted in a range of responses, from dismay to unqualified and devoted acceptance. I must admit to bewilderment in part because of all the pressing issues that confront Muslims in this country, many of which directly pertain to matters of social justice, yoga was one of the least expected amongst those that demanded urgency. It would have been useful for the Council to have directed its mind and resources to matters of faith that complement efforts aimed at the nurturing of an inclusive, just and compassionate society.

That being said, a ruling has been made. I say ruling because until and unless the ruling is endorsed by the fatwa committees of the various states and the Federal Territories and then gazetted (published in the official government journal), the ruling is not a fatwa.

The administration of Islam is a matter that falls within the exclusive purview of the state under the Federal Constitution and, as such, where fatwas are concerned within the sole domain of the state fatwa committee. In this context the National Fatwa Council allows for policy consultation at a federal level to facilitate a more unified vision of the practice of Islam, each state being legally entitled to pursue its own vision.

Within the state, it is for the Majlis Agama to take steps to gazette a ruling of the state fatwa committee. The resultant fatwa is prescribed by the respective state law as being binding on all Muslims as a dictate of Islam. They are duty bound to abide by and uphold the fatwa unless permitted by Islamic law to depart from it in matters of personal observance, belief or opinion. The burden of establishing that an exemption is permissible is however on the individual as state Islamic criminal law provides that acting contrary to fatwa is a criminal offence.

It is significant that despite a fatwa being for all purposes and intents a ‘law’ the breach of which is punishable, there is no need for rulings to be referred to the State Legislative Assembly before they are gazetted and become binding as fatwa. Seen in this light, it could be said that the Majlis Agama and the fatwa committee are therefore legislating.

The pressing question arises as to how this can be sanctioned in view of our Constitution having put in place a system of law-making centred on legislatures constituted by duly elected representatives. The making of binding fatwa in the manner provided for is a glaring anomaly from the dictates of the democratic processes enshrined in the Federal Constitution.

It is this very concern that drove a team of us to taking up two challenges in the Federal Court involving persons allegedly having been involved in deviationist Islam not too long ago. Amongst other things, our clients had been charged with acting contrary to fatwa; charges that for the reasons explained above took us to heart of law making.

In its decision earlier this year, the Federal Court disagreed with us and upheld the validity of the fatwa making process. With respect, in so concluding, the Federal Court in effect allowed for a subverting of Parliament, and the accountability the institution is intended to promote, in this extremely crucial aspect of the constitutional framework by giving licence to the religious bureaucracy to autonomously fashion a parallel system of law outside the established legislative structure and the supervision it envisages. I clarify here that I do not intend to cast aspersions on the qualifications, character or aims of the members of the respective majlis-majlis and fatwa committees. The implications of the decision of the Federal Court are however not easily reconciled with the very purpose of legislative power being constitutionally entrenched in the legislature, and the value of this entrenching to wider society.

The rakyat elected representatives to the legislature to ensure that our respective views were presented and taken into consideration as well as to allow us to have oversight over the processes that ultimately shape our lives. Our representatives should be making law as well as overseeing its making.

Legislature cannot be permitted to delegate its essential legislative function in any field, even to a well-intentioned specialist committee. This is not just about Islam; it is equally about all the other fields that specialist committees might be created for in the same way.

The limited numbers of a committee cannot compare to the full weight of the august houses of Parliament. That some of those in parliament may be of questionable competence, some might say sanity, is of no relevance as it is the underlying principle that is in issue. Allowing for a divesting of legislative power and control is most certainly a state of affairs that will wholly undermine democracy and true nation building.

Consider it from a different perspective. Would a State Legislative Assembly have enacted the offence of practicing yoga? I have my doubts, not least for the heated debates that the tabling of a bill to create the offence would have resulted in. If this were the case, then how is it that the system allows for the criminalising of yoga by the ruling of a committee and the mere gazetting of that ruling?

On the other hand, if a state fatwa committee were to produce an expert opinion that was then made the basis of a bill tabled in legislature, would it not be conceivable that with logic and reason, the bill would be carried? More work might have to be done, as explanations would have to be made that much clearer and factual basis of concerns set out coherently. However, considering that laws are being made, these are necessary prerequisites in any event for such grave efforts.

In the meanwhile I wait with bated breath for the next fatwa. Who knows, it may be about corruption.

(Malay Mail; 25th November 2008)

MIS

Subsequent to this article being submitted for publication yesterday, the Perak State Religious Department has acknowledged that it is necessary for His Highness the Sultan of Perak and the state Fatwa Committee to consider the matter before the policy can be implemented in the state of Perak. The Sultan of Selangor has also indicated reservations (see here). The gazetting of a fatwa requires the assent of the Sultan.

Navigating The Constitutional Impasse

It seems that we are well on the way to a constitutional crisis. A deadlock looms and, as some commentators including Professor Aziz Bahri of the International Islamic University have suggested, much will depend on how proactive the Yang di-Pertuan Agong can and will be in breaking it. In this, and more, it is becoming increasingly apparent that that the line between those who want change and those who do not will be the Federal Constitution.

Let us consider the objective elements.

Firstly, any Prime Minister of the nation must necessarily be the person who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the Dewan Rakyat. As to who it is that commands the confidence, this is a decision for the YDPA “in his judgment”.

Until the events in Trengganu shortly after the last general and state elections, it was commonly thought that this was really a matter of having the numbers, that is the person with the most number of supporters in the chamber would become the leader of the government. The interventionist position of the Regency Council, for all purposes and intents the Sultan, earlier this year shed light on how things could justifiably be viewed differently. The appointment of Ahmad Said as the Mentri Besar possibly set a precedent and gave us foundation for the argument that it was ultimately the judgment of the monarch that mattered.

This is relevant as the material provisions in the Federal Constitution are virtually identical to those in the Trengganu state constitution. The YDPA could, as such, approach the issue in a similar way. This is not necessarily impossible; the YDPA is the Sultan of Trengganu.

Secondly, a Prime Minister who no longer commands the confidence of the majority has two options. He can ask the YDPA to dissolve parliament and use that to call for fresh elections. The YDPA however has an absolute discretion to withhold consent and as such, could legitimately refuse. This would leave the Prime Minister with no option other than to tender his resignation and that of his Cabinet and pave the way to the appointment of a new Prime Minister, one who in the judgment of the YDPA commands the confidence of the majority.

Thirdly, the Federal Constitution does not say how to establish that the Prime Minister has “ceased to command the confidence of the majority”. A vote of no confidence is an obvious method but not necessarily the only one. To read the constitutional provision otherwise would not only be unwarranted (an unnecessary implication of meaning) but would also allow for unconstitutional action, such as the use of the provision to impede the expression of the majority of the Dewan Rakyat. It is possible that circumstances could arise where an incumbent government seeks to prevent the meeting of members in Parliament to undermine any attempt by the majority to form a new government. To read provisions of the Constitution to lend to such an outcome would be wholly repugnant to the scheme the Constitution puts in place.

As such, it is open to the YDPA to form a view through other means, such as direct meetings with the majority of the Dewan Rakyat, so as to satisfy himself that the incumbent Prime Minister has in fact ceased to command its confidence. Events in Perlis and Trengganu earlier this year are illustrative of this course. That this approach is not necessarily ideal, for being amongst other things, fraught with practical difficulties, does not in itself militate against such an approach having been within the contemplation by the founders of the Federal Constitution.

Fourthly, assuming the YDPA nonetheless felt it necessary to have a vote of confidence put through the Dewan Rakyat, a question arises as to how this would be approached. If parliament were sitting, this could arguably be put through the Dewan. Such a motion would be extraordinary and exceptional. Going to the very foundations of the legitimacy of the incumbent government, it would have to be treated as a matter of priority. To allows such a motion to be encumbered by the procedural requirements of parliament would be wholly repugnant to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Federal Constitution. Even though the Speaker does have control of proceedings in the Dewan, he must allow for urgent debate and a vote on the motion if there is sufficient foundation for the motion. He has taken an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Federal Constitution and, therefore, the system of governance it puts in place. Such a motion and its outcome are self-evidently matters of grave constitutional significance and impact that cannot be ignored.

This would be more the case if the YDPA gave indication that it was His Highness’ wish for the motion to be dealt with as a matter of utmost priority. Under the Federal Constitution, Parliament is constituted of the YDPA and the two houses of parliament and an expression of His Highness’ intent cannot but be given great weight.

If parliament is however not sitting, a question arises as to whether the motion should be deferred to a time when parliament reconvenes. The question of the legitimacy of an incumbent government is not a matter that can be taken lightly assuming there is reasonable foundation for a belief that it no longer commands the confidence of the majority. The government does not adjourn as parliament does and it continues to act on the basis that it has the mandate to do so throughout its term. It would therefore be only logical for parliament to reconvene on an urgent basis to debate and vote on the motion. This however raises the question of how parliament is to be summoned.

The Constitution provides that the YDPA summons parliament. This is arguably done on the advice of the Prime Minister and it is for this reason that parliamentary procedure provides for reference to the Prime Minister. The Constitution is however silent on a situation where the motion in issue is one aimed at establishing that the incumbent Prime Minster no longer commands confidence. So are parliamentary rules. Though it could be said that there is as such no power with the YDPA to summon parliament, to read the Constitution as vesting a discretion in the incumbent Prime Minister to determine whether the Dewan will meet on whether he or she commands the confidence of the majority would lend to an obviously self-defeating outcome. It would after all be in the interests of the incumbent Prime Minister not to allow for the summoning of the Dewan. This cannot be right.

It is reasonable to read the Constitution as providing for this exceptional situation in the following way: the YDPA has the discretion to summon parliament for this purpose in view of it being an incident to the absolute discretion of the YDPA to appoint as Prime Minister a person who commands the confidence of the majority. Simply put, the YDPA must be given means to ensure that the Prime Minister is a person who commands confidence if His Highness is given reason to apprehend otherwise.

As such, His Highness could direct the Speaker to summon the Dewan Rakyat to debate the motion. The Speaker would be at risk of defying a legitimate direction of the YDPA and breaching his oath of office, with all the consequences of such an act, if he refuses. Alternatively, the YDPA could direct the incumbent Prime Minister to summon the Dewan. A refusal would similarly run the risk of being an unlawful defiance of a legitimate direction or a breaching of the oath of office.

Sixthly, in the event the YDPA forms the view that the incumbent Prime Minister has ceased to command the confidence of the majority, the YDPA could then appoint a new Prime Minister. A further question arises as to whether the incumbent Prime Minster must firstly tender his resignation and that of his Cabinet. Though this would be ideal, I have my doubts as to whether it is a necessary prerequisite, especially if the incumbent government intends to undermine the forming of a new government. Though the Federal Constitution does not provide for the dismissal of a Prime Minister, the appointment of a new Prime Minister would merely be giving effect to the wishes of the majority of the Dewan and system of governance put in place by the Constitution.

But then, what if the incumbent government refuses to vacate office? If the new Prime Minister is sworn in and given the necessary instruments of power, the incumbent government would in effect no longer be the government of the day and would no longer in law be lawfully possessed of power. Those individuals who lend themselves to this situation could be viewed as trespassing and, worse still, be seen as attempting to usurp the legitimate power of a lawful government. This has grave consequences.

The analysis set out above is based on my understanding of the Federal Constitution and it goes without saying that others may take a different view of the issues. However, it must be borne in mind that as the supreme law, the Constitution defines the way in which we are to organize ourselves and arrange our affairs. This extends to transitions of power, something which the founders could not but have contemplated as being possible. The Constitution was drafted in general terms so as to ensure that it was relevant and applicable to situations in an evolving nation and remain a vibrant and living law. The answers are there if we look for them fairly and objectively.

In the difficult times ahead, it is clear that the various factions will take positions on key constitutional provisions and interpret them in a way that favour their intended aims. In this, the YDPA plays a crucial role as does the Judiciary. It is therefore vital, and I say this respectfully, that both these institutions be seen as being detached and far removed from the politics of the unfolding events. How the approaching crisis is resolved, and the way in which this is done and seen to be done, are matters that go to our ability to meet the future with the stability and conviction that this nation requires to meet the challenges ahead.

MIS

Will The Speaker Uphold The Constitution?

It is not insignificant that some have resorted to so-called parliamentary procedure to impede the debate of the SAPP no-confidence motion. It is as clear a sign as any that those who cite standing orders, and those whose interests they serve, would rather not have the motion debated at all. If our experience with the previous Speaker of Parliament is anything to go by, it is possible to make motions disappear in Parliament. All that is needed is a unilateral declaration of irrelevance or a lack of urgency or, as is now suggested, that procedure must be followed.

It is apparent that if attempts are made by SAPP members of parliament to have the motion debated on Monday, the Speaker will be called upon to adjourn the debate of the Motion on the basis that standing orders have not been complied with. Lim Kit Siang has suggested that as there are no specific standing orders on a no-confidence motion, such a motion would be treated as an ordinary motion under Standing Order 27. This requires fourteen days notice and is subject to the Speaker’s discretion. Order 18 which provides for urgent debates on matters of public interest requires forty-eight hours notice and, according to Minister Nazri Aziz, does not allow for a vote.

I am not certain that this is the best or correct way to approach the issue.

The Federal Constitution provides that the Houses of Parliament regulate their own procedure (Article 62). The Speaker is the chief officer of the legislative body, in this case the Dewan Rakyat. He presides at its sittings, exercising authority and power that are in actuality the powers of the Dewan Rakyat which the Dewan Rakyat is taken as having committed to the Speaker for practical purpose. This is the source of the Speaker’s discretion, a state of affairs reinforced by the constitutional provision providing for the election of the Speaker (Article 57).

As in any Westminster system, control over Executive action is a crucial function of parliament. This arises from the Executive being responsible to parliament, the Prime Minister and his cabinet being members of either the Dewan Rakyat or the Senate. Parliament as such supervises administration and influences governmental policies. In this scheme of things, the Prime Minister undoubtedly plays a vital role. As the renowned constitutional law jurist, M P Jain, observes:

“He keeps the fabric of parliamentary form of government in working order. The entire constitutional machinery would appear to revolve around his personality. He has thus been described as ‘the keystone of the Cabinet arch,’ who is central to its formation, central to its life, and central to its death.”

It is for this reason that upon a new Dewan Rakyat being constituted after a general election, the appointment of the Prime Minister is a matter of great urgency. The Prime Minister is by convention the leader of the political party or coalition that forms the majority of the Dewan Rakyat though this is strictly not necessary. The Federal Constitution stipulates that it is the member of the Dewan Rakyat that in his judgment is likely to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Dewan that is to be appointed as the Prime Minister (Article 43(2)). As we have recently seen in Perlis and Trengganu, this may not necessarily be a matter of having a sufficient number of members of parliament supporting the appointment.

It is equally significant that the Federal Constitution expressly provides (Article 43(4) that:

“If the Prime Minister ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, then, unless at his request the Yang di-Pertuan Agong dissolves Parliament, the Prime Minister shall tender the resignation of the Cabinet.”

I say significant for two reasons. Firstly, the matter of the Prime Minister no longer commanding the confidence of the majority is in many other jurisdictions a matter of constitutional convention. In the Malaysian context, it is a specific constitutional provision thus underscoring the need for continued confidence in the Prime Minister. Secondly, the inclusion of the provision is reflective of an intention on the part of the founders of the Constitution that confidence in the Prime Minister be understood as a threshold requirement, or a prerequisite, to the functioning of government.

This has great impact on the question of what it is the Speaker should do on Monday. The constitutional framework gives the Speaker no choice but to treat the no-confidence motion as a matter of crucial significance. The motion in effect puts into question the validity of the Prime Minister’s continued functioning as the Prime Minister. In the order of things, this is an issue the importance of which transcends all other issues. How could the Dewan Rakyat debate any other matter, be it fuel subsidies or the price of chicken, when the functioning of the Prime Minister, and indirectly the Cabinet, has been called into question. It is after all not just his resignation he tenders if the majority ceases to have command confidence in him, it is the resignation of the Cabinet.

For this self-evident reason, the no-confidence motion cannot be characterized as an ‘ordinary motion’ or even a special or urgent motion on a matter of public interest. It is an extraordinary motion that that stands on independent footing. Does it matter that no standing order has been issue in respect of such motions? I think not. Its character and nature makes redundant the need for special procedure, demanding immediate attention. The Federal Constitution demands it.

There is however a question as to whether the Speaker should take into consideration the fact that only two SAPP members appear to support the motion. No other members of parliament have as yet formally expressed their support of the same. It could therefore be said that as things stand, the motion can not carry in view of the negligible support it receives. This is a matter that those who wish to support the motion and its urgent debate must take into consideration. A procedural mindset lends itself to the upholding of all formalities.

MIS

Do You Remember, Mr Speaker

That when you took office, you took an oath that you would “faithfully discharge the duties of that office to the best of my ability, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia, and will preserve, protect and defend its Constitution."

In return for your commitment to the defence of this nation and its ideals, you were and still are guaranteed by law a salary paid from the Consolidated Fund. The monies in this fund are monies raised or received from the Federation. Monies raised from the hard work of Malaysians, the majority of whom pay their taxes in fulfillment of their end of the bargain, of their respective duties to this nation. They pay and they pay, with the strain of an existence that is difficult at best for many, every bead of sweat on their brow a testament to their will to survive.

I ask you, Mr Speaker. Do you think that you are honouring these Malaysians with your actions? Do you think you are preserving, protecting and defending the Constitution that is the only guarantee of the just and compassionate society that these Malaysians are entitled to? The only future that our young deserve?

I fail to see how that could be so when matters of national importance are prevented from being aired by you. It would appear that you act almost mechanically in rejecting motion after motion. The essence of parliamentary democracy is free, frank and fearless discussion in parliament; without fear or favour. And yet, we are seeing almost no significant debate on key issues that affect us all. Parliament has been allowed to be manipulated and I wonder whether you see this.

Do you not recognize that you are a trustee for the Malaysian rakyat? In that, sir, you owe a great duty to ensure fairness. I appreciate that your appointment may have been arranged by those who constitute the Government, and that you are not an elected member of parliament. This does not, should not, make you beholden to the Government, or anyone else for that matter. Your appointment is proof enough of your ability to supervise the Dewan Rakyat as it should be.

By virtue of your position, and the measures provided by the Constitution to secure yourself from arbitrary reactions, you are ensured the means to act in fairness. In doing so, you would be doing nothing more than what is expected of you by the Constitution and the rakyat of this nation.

Act now, sir, in defence of the nation. It is a dark time for us all, all our families, and the fate of this nation rests on the conscience of a few good men and women. The path to which you hold the key is a path that allows the issues that are fermenting in a cauldron of tension to be resolved peacefully through the frank discussion so crucial for the truth.

Remember, Mr Speaker, your oath and the significance of that oath. Remember your sacred duties. And above all, remember Malaysia and its children.

MIS