The Cost Of Politics

(This was published by The Malaysian Insider as as "They play, we pay")

The Cost Of Politics

The UMNO Assembly has come and gone and, as has been the case for at least the last three assemblies, in its wake many of us have been left uneasy and in a state of disquiet. Seeing the inner workings of the Leviathan’s mind is never an easy thing, even at the best of times. And these really are the worst of times.

Power-lust has put a debilitating strain on our national institutions; they are in the mind of the public nothing more than lifeless marionettes in a caricature of democracy. The accumulation of money and influence has for some time now been the greater social good in the minds of many of those who claim the right to lead us. Governance has been wholly enslaved to the perverse politics required to feed this monstrous craving.

One does not have to go to great lengths anymore to demonstrate these conclusions. After this last assembly, it is a matter of public record. Reading the speeches made, I was struck by how for many of those who attended the assembly there is no other way other than the UMNO way that they are familiar with: exclusive privilege through patronage.

While it could be said that these are matters concerning the internal workings of UMNO and as such really none of my business, this cannot be the case when UMNO stakes a claim on the premiership of this nation as it does. The Federal Constitution does not provide that the President of UMNO must be the Prime Minister. That is however the understanding within the Barisan whose component parties are compelled to leave the choice of that individual to UMNO’s admittedly skewed method of electing its President.

This state of affairs is made more complex by the expectation on the part of UMNO that it is entitled to govern this nation, a viewpoint it gives life to through its control over the wider system of governance. The experience of the rakyat with matters of state has been a disappointing one and the general belief is that all constitutional bodies and agencies of the state will act to further the interests of UMNO and, where interests overlap, the Barisan.

Seen in this light, the internal workings of UMNO are a matter of national concern; the national interest underscoring the appointment of a Prime Minister is ultimately left vulnerable to those who are able to successfully wield influence at the UMNO Assembly.

As I have written elsewhere, this is not the scheme envisaged by the founders of the Federal Constitution, which instead puts in place an appointment process grounded on His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s judgment as to who it is that commands the confidence of the majority of members of the Dewan Rakyat.

For many in UMNO and the Barisan however, political convention must trump constitutionalism. Both the party and the coalition have made this clear in the way in which concerns over the appropriateness of Datuk Seri Najib Razak as Prime Minister are being avoided.

This cannot be right, the unease that the failure to take appropriate steps to clear the air has given rise to is no small matter. It pertains directly to public confidence in the due administration of this nation. If the positions were reversed, the same rationale would apply: Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim would not be an appropriate candidate until the accusation of sodomy by Saiful Bukhari was dealt with.

Public confidence is crucial to our survival. We are a nation in crisis facing external challenges of great magnitude. Part of the reason for this is the sustained maladministration that we have had to endure over a prolonged period of time. Put bluntly, the nation is not firing on all pistons and we are not nearly as prepared or resourced to deal with what we will have to be when the full significance of world events hits us.

The choice of Prime Minister at this point is a crucial one. In addition to addressing Malaysia’s response to the global economic crisis and its impact on the rakyat, the next administration must address two objectives that are vital to our continued survival. The first of these is the serious deficiencies in our current process of general and state elections. These go deeper than the issue of perceived Election Commission and Police bias to the more fundamental question of whether democratic purpose is being achieved through a first-past-the-post system and the “weighted” delineation of constituencies. Electoral ethics must also be made a priority with scrutiny of the continued value of racial ideologies that serve no purpose than to divide us. True democratic process is the only way in which this nation can ensure that it remains competitive.

Secondly, the foundations of governance must be shored up. The doctrine of separation of powers must be re-entrenched to ensure the due application of checks and balances. For this, reforms must be carried out at more than a superficial level. For this to occur, constitutionalism must be breathed into the organs and agencies of state once more. The Judiciary must be liberated from any and all political influence and be made as capable as it once was, with public confidence in the institution. The legislatures of the nation must be allowed to return to previous glory when debates were permitted without fear or favour and the legislative chamber served a purpose higher than rubber-stamping the dictates of majoritarianism.

Above all, the Executive must be made accountable once again.

This is what we need if we do not want to see this nation failing. Momentum however threatens to propel us forward in that direction. The brakes need to be applied and our direction changed, impelled forward by the will of the rakyat with the Federal Constitution serving as our roadmap.

The question we must confront is who it is that will be able to lead us in doing that.

If I wonder whether Datuk Seri Najib considers himself capable of doing this, it is because he has said precious little to suggest that he has considered the precarious situation we are in. I am also wary of the political forces that paved his way to the top that will impede him much in the same way as they did the out-going Prime Minister. There is also the matter of public sentiment concerning various matters that he either has been, or is seen to have been, involved in.

Ironically, the one person in UMNO who holds to a need for serious reform at all levels, Tengku Razaleigh, received only one nomination and could not contest the presidency. This was an error on the part of UMNO in my view.

My fear is that the nation will have to pay the price.

Malik Imtiaz Sarwar is the current President of the National Human Rights Society (HAKAM) and a lawyer. He has been at the forefront of efforts aimed at promoting constitutionalism and the Rule of Law. His blog ‘Disquiet’, and weekly column of the same name with the Malay Mail, are widely read

(Malaysian Insider 31st March 2009)

MIS

Navigating The Constitutional Impasse

It seems that we are well on the way to a constitutional crisis. A deadlock looms and, as some commentators including Professor Aziz Bahri of the International Islamic University have suggested, much will depend on how proactive the Yang di-Pertuan Agong can and will be in breaking it. In this, and more, it is becoming increasingly apparent that that the line between those who want change and those who do not will be the Federal Constitution.

Let us consider the objective elements.

Firstly, any Prime Minister of the nation must necessarily be the person who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the Dewan Rakyat. As to who it is that commands the confidence, this is a decision for the YDPA “in his judgment”.

Until the events in Trengganu shortly after the last general and state elections, it was commonly thought that this was really a matter of having the numbers, that is the person with the most number of supporters in the chamber would become the leader of the government. The interventionist position of the Regency Council, for all purposes and intents the Sultan, earlier this year shed light on how things could justifiably be viewed differently. The appointment of Ahmad Said as the Mentri Besar possibly set a precedent and gave us foundation for the argument that it was ultimately the judgment of the monarch that mattered.

This is relevant as the material provisions in the Federal Constitution are virtually identical to those in the Trengganu state constitution. The YDPA could, as such, approach the issue in a similar way. This is not necessarily impossible; the YDPA is the Sultan of Trengganu.

Secondly, a Prime Minister who no longer commands the confidence of the majority has two options. He can ask the YDPA to dissolve parliament and use that to call for fresh elections. The YDPA however has an absolute discretion to withhold consent and as such, could legitimately refuse. This would leave the Prime Minister with no option other than to tender his resignation and that of his Cabinet and pave the way to the appointment of a new Prime Minister, one who in the judgment of the YDPA commands the confidence of the majority.

Thirdly, the Federal Constitution does not say how to establish that the Prime Minister has “ceased to command the confidence of the majority”. A vote of no confidence is an obvious method but not necessarily the only one. To read the constitutional provision otherwise would not only be unwarranted (an unnecessary implication of meaning) but would also allow for unconstitutional action, such as the use of the provision to impede the expression of the majority of the Dewan Rakyat. It is possible that circumstances could arise where an incumbent government seeks to prevent the meeting of members in Parliament to undermine any attempt by the majority to form a new government. To read provisions of the Constitution to lend to such an outcome would be wholly repugnant to the scheme the Constitution puts in place.

As such, it is open to the YDPA to form a view through other means, such as direct meetings with the majority of the Dewan Rakyat, so as to satisfy himself that the incumbent Prime Minister has in fact ceased to command its confidence. Events in Perlis and Trengganu earlier this year are illustrative of this course. That this approach is not necessarily ideal, for being amongst other things, fraught with practical difficulties, does not in itself militate against such an approach having been within the contemplation by the founders of the Federal Constitution.

Fourthly, assuming the YDPA nonetheless felt it necessary to have a vote of confidence put through the Dewan Rakyat, a question arises as to how this would be approached. If parliament were sitting, this could arguably be put through the Dewan. Such a motion would be extraordinary and exceptional. Going to the very foundations of the legitimacy of the incumbent government, it would have to be treated as a matter of priority. To allows such a motion to be encumbered by the procedural requirements of parliament would be wholly repugnant to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Federal Constitution. Even though the Speaker does have control of proceedings in the Dewan, he must allow for urgent debate and a vote on the motion if there is sufficient foundation for the motion. He has taken an oath to preserve, protect and defend the Federal Constitution and, therefore, the system of governance it puts in place. Such a motion and its outcome are self-evidently matters of grave constitutional significance and impact that cannot be ignored.

This would be more the case if the YDPA gave indication that it was His Highness’ wish for the motion to be dealt with as a matter of utmost priority. Under the Federal Constitution, Parliament is constituted of the YDPA and the two houses of parliament and an expression of His Highness’ intent cannot but be given great weight.

If parliament is however not sitting, a question arises as to whether the motion should be deferred to a time when parliament reconvenes. The question of the legitimacy of an incumbent government is not a matter that can be taken lightly assuming there is reasonable foundation for a belief that it no longer commands the confidence of the majority. The government does not adjourn as parliament does and it continues to act on the basis that it has the mandate to do so throughout its term. It would therefore be only logical for parliament to reconvene on an urgent basis to debate and vote on the motion. This however raises the question of how parliament is to be summoned.

The Constitution provides that the YDPA summons parliament. This is arguably done on the advice of the Prime Minister and it is for this reason that parliamentary procedure provides for reference to the Prime Minister. The Constitution is however silent on a situation where the motion in issue is one aimed at establishing that the incumbent Prime Minster no longer commands confidence. So are parliamentary rules. Though it could be said that there is as such no power with the YDPA to summon parliament, to read the Constitution as vesting a discretion in the incumbent Prime Minister to determine whether the Dewan will meet on whether he or she commands the confidence of the majority would lend to an obviously self-defeating outcome. It would after all be in the interests of the incumbent Prime Minister not to allow for the summoning of the Dewan. This cannot be right.

It is reasonable to read the Constitution as providing for this exceptional situation in the following way: the YDPA has the discretion to summon parliament for this purpose in view of it being an incident to the absolute discretion of the YDPA to appoint as Prime Minister a person who commands the confidence of the majority. Simply put, the YDPA must be given means to ensure that the Prime Minister is a person who commands confidence if His Highness is given reason to apprehend otherwise.

As such, His Highness could direct the Speaker to summon the Dewan Rakyat to debate the motion. The Speaker would be at risk of defying a legitimate direction of the YDPA and breaching his oath of office, with all the consequences of such an act, if he refuses. Alternatively, the YDPA could direct the incumbent Prime Minister to summon the Dewan. A refusal would similarly run the risk of being an unlawful defiance of a legitimate direction or a breaching of the oath of office.

Sixthly, in the event the YDPA forms the view that the incumbent Prime Minister has ceased to command the confidence of the majority, the YDPA could then appoint a new Prime Minister. A further question arises as to whether the incumbent Prime Minster must firstly tender his resignation and that of his Cabinet. Though this would be ideal, I have my doubts as to whether it is a necessary prerequisite, especially if the incumbent government intends to undermine the forming of a new government. Though the Federal Constitution does not provide for the dismissal of a Prime Minister, the appointment of a new Prime Minister would merely be giving effect to the wishes of the majority of the Dewan and system of governance put in place by the Constitution.

But then, what if the incumbent government refuses to vacate office? If the new Prime Minister is sworn in and given the necessary instruments of power, the incumbent government would in effect no longer be the government of the day and would no longer in law be lawfully possessed of power. Those individuals who lend themselves to this situation could be viewed as trespassing and, worse still, be seen as attempting to usurp the legitimate power of a lawful government. This has grave consequences.

The analysis set out above is based on my understanding of the Federal Constitution and it goes without saying that others may take a different view of the issues. However, it must be borne in mind that as the supreme law, the Constitution defines the way in which we are to organize ourselves and arrange our affairs. This extends to transitions of power, something which the founders could not but have contemplated as being possible. The Constitution was drafted in general terms so as to ensure that it was relevant and applicable to situations in an evolving nation and remain a vibrant and living law. The answers are there if we look for them fairly and objectively.

In the difficult times ahead, it is clear that the various factions will take positions on key constitutional provisions and interpret them in a way that favour their intended aims. In this, the YDPA plays a crucial role as does the Judiciary. It is therefore vital, and I say this respectfully, that both these institutions be seen as being detached and far removed from the politics of the unfolding events. How the approaching crisis is resolved, and the way in which this is done and seen to be done, are matters that go to our ability to meet the future with the stability and conviction that this nation requires to meet the challenges ahead.

MIS