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Showing posts with label Syariah Courts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syariah Courts. Show all posts

Friday, April 24, 2009

Translating Policy Into Practice


Translating Policy Into Practice

The media reports that the cabinet has decided that children of marriages where one spouse subsequently embraces Islam would remain in the faith that the parents had agreed on at the time of marriage. The cabinet has also appeared to decide that the civil courts are to dissolve such marriages.

These decisions are welcome ones. They indicate willingness on the part of the administration to deal with issues that have for some time now been studiously avoided, a state of affairs that had prompted the establishment of the coalition of NGOs calling itself “Article 11” and its “Equal Protection For All” campaign in 2006.

The decisions also indicate the policy position of the current administration, one that on its face appears to adhere to the constitutional guarantees of equality and the right of parents to choose the religion of their children. The Constitution guarantees the right of a parent to decide the religious instruction of a minor child. The Constitution provides that words in the singular are to be understood to include the plural, parent being “parents”. By virtue of this and the guarantee against discrimination on grounds of gender, it is clear that the intention was to vest guardianship rights in both parents. This is reinforced by federal law.

I am however uncertain as to how this policy position is to translate into practice as the cabinet has little or no direct power in this regard. Religion is a matter for the state and not the federal government; each state has exclusive authority over the administration of Islam within the boundaries of that state. This would include matters of conversion of children and the jurisdiction of the syariah courts, both of which are matters in respect of which the state legislative assembly has the competence to enact laws on.

Though the constitution itself lends support to the policy position of the cabinet, and as such could be invoked to reign in those state agencies involved in these matters, the question of whether there has been a transgressing of limits is one for the courts. The courts have however in recent years handed down decision after decision that have undermined the constitutional framework and entrenched as principle the very matters that the cabinet now wishes to address.

In 2004, the High Court in Shamala Sathiyaseelan ruled that the converting husband had a right to convert the children into Islam without the consent of the wife. The court also ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the wife’s application to challenge the legitimacy of the conversion. Accepting that the wife was without recourse for not being able to move the syariah court as a non-muslim, the court counseled her to seek the assistance of the Majlis Agama. This is a scenario that the majority decision of the Federal Court in Lina Joy reinforced in 2007

In the same vein, a majority bench of the Federal Court in Subashini Rajasingam concluded in 2008 that either parent could convert a child of the marriage into Islam. It ignored the non-discrimination guarantee as well as the interpretation provision for words in the singular and focused on the word “parent”, interpreting it to mean “parent” in the singular. The majority also decided that the muslim party was free to commence proceedings in the syariah court even though the non-muslim party was entitled to seek dissolution and maintenance and custody orders in the High Court.

These decisions and others like them stand in the way of the cabinet implementing its policy position. It is ironic that the decisions noted above were largely the result of ill conceived and shortsighted positions taken by the Attorney General’s Chambers on these matters, positions that sought to denude the High Court of jurisdiction to allow for the preservation of an unjust status quo.

To move forward, the cabinet must therefore take the bull by the horns.

I assume that the cabinet made its decisions based on advice from the Attorney General. It is therefore imperative that the Attorney General articulates his revised position on these issues in the courts as soon as possible. The Shamala case comes before the Court of Appeal on Monday and he should apply to intervene to make the necessary points. Being matters of great constitutional significance that are clearly in the public interest, they warrant his involvement.

(Malay Mail; 24th April 2009)

MIS

Friday, May 23, 2008

A Further Note On Jurisdiction And Syariah Courts

The Federal Court handed down a decision yesterday on the question of the jurisdiction of the syariah courts in the case of Abdul Kahar Ahmad v Government of Selangor & Others. The Federal Court confirmed that it is the Federal Court that has jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the interpretation of the Federal Constitution and the competence of the legislatives bodies to make law, even where such law pertains to Islam. In so concluding, it reiterated its decision in Latifah Mat Zin that the jurisdiction of the syariah courts is as delineated by the Federal Constitution and as vested by enacted law.

I have written about the case before on this blog. Kahar has commenced proceedings in the Federal Court to challenge the validity of certain provisions of Selangor law going to the binding nature of gazetted fatwas (without having passed through the State Legislative Assembly) and the criminalization of certain acts for being offences against the 'precepts of Islam' (this is a constitutional requirement; Kahar amongst other things contends that it is not an offence against the precepts of Islam to act contrary to fatwa as a fatwa is mere opinion).

The Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (MAIS) had applied for leave to intervene as an interested party. The Federal Court allowed the application (Tun Fairuz was then the Chief Justice and chaired the panel that granted leave; we opposed the application as the underlying proceedings concerned only the question of legislative competence). MAIS then applied for a stay of proceedings in the Federal Court on the ground that only the syariah court was competent to decide whether the offences concerned were against the precepts of Islam. This was notwithstanding the fact that the the Federal Constitution itself employs the phrase in delimiting the competence of the State Legislative Assembly to make laws pertaining to Islam.

We opposed the application on the basis that the Federal Constitution clearly empowers the Federal Court to determine proceedings of this nature. We further argued that there was no question of any of the parties, save Kahar himself, being within the jurisdiction of the syariah court as MAIS, the Government of Selangor and the Federal Government were not 'persons professing the religion of Islam'. The Federal Court however did not think it necessary to rule on the latter point.

The Star reports the decision today ('Federal Court to hear application by 'prophet'). It is reproduced below.

____________________________________________________________________

PUTRAJAYA: The Federal Court is the right court to hear a 57-year-old self-proclaimed prophet’s application to challenge certain provisions in Selangor’s Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment.

The apex court decided this yesterday when it dismissed an application by the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (Mais) for an order that the issue be decided by the Syariah High Court.

As such, the suit by Abdul Kahar Ahmad to challenge the legality of the five sections of the enactment he is charged under will continue at the Federal Court.

Chief Justice Datuk Abdul Hamid Mohamad, in his judgment, said there was nothing in the Constitution to say (the Constitution’s) interpretation was within the jurisdiction of the Syariah court.

The Syariah court’s jurisdiction, he added, was confined to the matters enumerated in the state list of the Constitution and as enacted by the respective states.

Court of Appeal President Justice Zaki Tun Azmi and Justice Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin, who sat on the three-man bench with the Chief Justice, concurred with his decision.

Abdul Kahar was charged in the Shah Alam Syariah High Court in August 2005 with five offences under the Selangor Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment.

He pleaded not guilty to all the charges.

Among other things, he is accused of declaring himself a prophet and for ridiculing the practices of Islam.

The next hearing date is fixed for May 28.

Abdul Kahar is seeking to declare certain sections of the Selangor Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment and the Islamic Religious Administration (Selangor) Enactment null and void.

The Star, 23th May 2008

Thursday, May 15, 2008

Of Religion And Choice


Of Religion And Choice

It may be wise to pause for breath before rushing out to celebrate the decision of the Penang syariah court in the Siti Fatimah case. Though welcome, not least for the fact that it allows Siti Fatimah to carry on with her life, we must ask ourselves whether it really sets the required precedent that the issue of apostasy requires.

I do not think it does.

The first difficulty I have with the decision is its basis in law. The syariah court has jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam. Siti Fatimah claimed, and still claims, that she was not such a person and that she converted only for the purpose of marriage. Let us say for purposes of argument that at the time of her conversion, and in the period she wished to remain married, she was for all purposes a Muslim. It is apparent that at some point prior to her petitioning the syariah court, she ceased being one and was, as such, no longer a person professing the religion of Islam.

How then did the court assume jurisdiction?

This brings me to the second difficulty. There are two distinct polar views concerning the issue of renunciation. At one end, there is what I call the pro-choice view that allows every person, without qualification, a freedom to determine of their own right their choice of religion. The Federal Constitution guarantees this choice in Article 11 which vests the freedom in ‘every person’. At the other extreme, there is the view that the choice of leaving Islam is one that can only be exercised through, and as such by, the syariah court. I call this the pro-regulation view.

It is apparent that the pro-regulation view renders illusory the right to choice of religion. For persons who happen in law (as opposed to ‘in fact’) to be a Muslim, the decision of which religion to profess is no longer theirs. If they wished to leave Islam they would have to go on bended knee to the syariah court, uncertain that the syariah court would ultimately agree with their petition. In the legal fiction perpetuated by those who espouse the pro-regulation view, a group that includes those judges of the Federal Court who formed the majority in Lina Joy, a person is a Muslim until such time as that person is declared a non-Muslim. It does not matter that the person may not in fact profess Islam any longer. Though an incredible perspective, it has nonetheless informed constitutional jurisprudence as of late and entrenched a mind-set that has resulted in grave injustice to persons unfortunate enough to have had to confront the issue.

It is on this precarious premise that the syariah court of Penang assumed jurisdiction over a person it ultimately declared as being not a Muslim. Our celebrating of the decision would as such be a celebration of a wrongful seizing of jurisdiction and wielding of power by a court not empowered to do so in law. It would also be, where Muslims are concerned, a commending of the vesting of the right to choose in a third party agency, leaving in tatters the fundamental liberty so painstakingly provided for in the Constitution.

Regardless of the convenience of the Siti Fatimah decision, it cannot be a good thing. Media reports suggest that the Penang syariah court was swayed by Siti Fatimah not having been given proper advice about Islam by her former husband and the Islamic authorities. This means that the court could take a different view of those who were born into the faith, such as Lina Joy, or those who made a decision to embrace Islam after due consideration. The court would after all be at liberty to do so if it were vested with a discretion.

I am concerned that the decision may distract from meaningful and coherent efforts aimed at ensuring a just and constitutional solution to the issue of apostasy. We should not lose sight of the fact that before a grossly misconceived decision of the Supreme Court handed down in 1999 (Soon Singh), Muslims were not required to obtain an exit-order from the syariah courts. They left the faith, declaring the fact by deed poll and carried on with their lives in relative privacy. The public face of Islam was left unscarred and the religion was not made a victim in a way that it has been of late.

(Malay Mail; 13th May 2008)
MIS