The Government Man

The Government Man

Allow me to hypothesize with you this week.

Let us, for arguments sake, say that those detained under the ISA are treated in a manner that leaves much to be desired. Assume that they are subjected to tactics of intimidation and coercion, either through interrogation or carrot-and-stick strategies that leave them mentally traumatized. At the whim of those who are in charge of them, they could be kept in solitary confinement for prolonged periods, denied visitation rights, be given food that could not in any way (and I do not mean any disrespect to the egg or those who eat it) be described as wholesome or nutritious or given amounts so meager that health and strength are affected. As a consequence, those detained are suffering.

Would that be torture? For those of you who say ‘no’, would it instead amount to cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment? For those of you who still say ‘no’, what if I were to add that those detained have not been found guilty of any crime and, in fact, those who have been and are serving prison terms, are treated better? Would it make a difference?

A theorist would have answered that the treatment described would by any standard have amounted to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. This would have been reinforced by his (or her) belief that the detention was unlawful for having been occasioned without due process.

I share that view; in the presence of such factors it could be reasonably concluded that detainees are being subjected to some form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, if not outright torture. My view, like that of the theorist, would be supported by a number of international human rights instruments including the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These instruments and commentary collectively say that subjecting a detainee to intense mental stress, through sleep deprivation or prolonged solitary confinement or food that was inedible or lacking in nutritional value, is arguably torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

On the other hand, a Malaysian diplomat or administrator, the hypothetical Government Man, would in all probability answer that there is no question of the treatment being torture or anything else offensive. How could it be, he would ask, when there is no law in this country that says these things amount to torture? After all, he might add with a conspiratorial wink, the Federal Constitution does not say that these things could not be done, just as it does not mention democracy.

Trying to argue the point further, one might point to the fact that Malaysia is a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. In this capacity, Malaysia sits at the core of the international human rights system. Surely, by virtue of its appointment as such, Malaysia is morally bound to live up to the expectations of the international community?

The government representative might give this some thought, or pretend to, and then, with a sigh of regret, say that Malaysia has not ratified any of the international treaties that proscribe torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. And, he might laughingly add that if one wanted to consider international expectations, why not take into account the kind of things that the United States has done in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib?

Saving the best for last, one could then point to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which also prohibits this kind of treatment. Malaysia has adopted and re-adopted the UDHR in one form or the other so many times over the years that it must have a bearing.

Shrugging, he would say somewhat condescendingly that the declaration is just that, a declaration. It has no binding effect. For that, one needs to ratify a treaty and, as has been explained, Malaysia has not ratified any such treaty. That the role of the UDHR has evolved over time and that in having become a cornerstone of the human rights system, it has gone far beyond being merely a statement of aspirations would not appear to strike the Government Man as a factor worth troubling over.

Much has been said about Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib. Questions have been asked as to how the United States, a party to the CCPR and the Torture Convention, could have allowed for this. Some with influence have argued that the treaties only apply to the “territory” of the States. Such sophistry is a hallmark of the political underpinnings of the human rights system, a tried and tested way for states to avoid playing by the universal rules.

Malaysia is no exception. When inconvenient, it has rejected the United Nations processes, in particular its human rights system. Over the years, we have heard of how we have distinct values of our own because we are Asian or that as a Muslim country, the governing paradigm is the syariah, in response to queries as to why international norms are not being met. These responses have bordered on the ridiculous; these alternative value systems do not lend themselves to cruelty and injustice any more than any other system does.

The refusal by the Government of Malaysia to ratify any of the major human rights treaties, in particular the Torture Convention and the CCPR, cannot be justified. The only inference that can be drawn is that the Government of Malaysia does not want to be constrained by these instruments.

We do not need the Government Man to tell us why.

(Malik Imtiaz Sarwar is counsel to Raja Petra Kamarudin who was detained under the Internal Security Act on 12th September 2008. He is the President of the National Human Rights Society and blogs as ‘Disquiet’ at www.malikimtiaz.blogspot.com)

(Malay Mail; 7th October 2008)

MIS

Extremism Does Not Define Religion

(Published in the New Sunday Times, 14th January 2007 as "Extremism, Not Religion, Begets Violence")

I HAD not been told that my workshop was potentially the most controversial. At an international conference in Prague last November, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the United Nations' Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion of Belief, I was co-facilitating a workshop on the relationship between the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression.

My presentation focused on the twin pillars of freedom of religion: The freedom to profess (or not to profess as the case may be) as a personal or internal expression of one's belief; and the freedom to manifest, or externally express that belief through an act of worship or by not worshiping. The experience I had gained, in cases dealing with the denial of the freedom of religion, had led me to understand that while no one could impede another's internal expression, much could be done to restrict the manifestation of that belief.

The nuances of expression in religion must be explored at all levels, from the right of the individual to profess and practice a religion of choice, to a state's justifications for clamping down on free discussion concerning religious practices. My involvement in various efforts has led me to the conclusion that, other than to genuinely preserve public order, free expression on matters of religion is vital if a community is to defend against intolerance and extremism. This is at the heart of the 1981 Declaration.

Out of the 50 participants in our session, more than half were diplomats. And everyone wanted to talk about the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.h.) and the controversial speech by the Pope. The European diplomats were keen to defend their position on the freedom of expression underlying these events. Representatives of Islamic countries were, on the other hand, driven to point to the insensitivity and the underlying insult. All indicators pointed to a potentially explosive morning.

As my co-facilitator, a senior director from Amnesty International, and I began to navigate through the session, it became apparent that in order to ensure a meaningful dialogue we needed to ensure that the language was kept civil and the concepts objective.

This was to prove challenging as one of the first salvos into the fray was from a British academic. He scathingly made two points. First, that Islam demanded sensitivity and acceptance of its particular idiosyncrasies but was unwilling to reciprocate with tolerance and understanding. Referring to the cartoon episode, he pointed out that the Islamic world had not attempted to understand that in allowing for the publication, the publisher may not have intended to insult Islam but rather uphold a universal freedom of expression. The violence of reactions was proof of the rejection of any other view. In this vein, secondly, he went on to characterize Islam as a religion of violence.

Objectively, one could see why he might have thought so. I do not mean that he was right in his conclusions. The sad truth, however, is that a lot of violence is done in the name of Islam. The violence is not limited to acts of terrorism but includes aggression, abuses of power and insensitivity. I have seen some of that violence first hand. There was, as such, a basis for his skewed perceptions of Islam.

However, not everyone in the room was prepared to consider his position with the necessary objectivity. The outrage was immediate and loud. This was ironic as it served to reinforce the point the academic was making. Where were the objectivity, rationality and broad-mindedness that one associates with Islam, I found myself wondering.

Amidst the protests, I thought it might be useful for the others to hear a clarification of his stance. I believed that he might not be anti-Islamic and that he might sincerely hold the view that he was espousing. I also recognised that there was a possibility that he could not see that he was confusing issues, much as the others were. The premise of his argument was tenuous at best; the same reasoning could be employed against any religion. World events, past and present, reflect that.

There was, however, some value in the academic's point of view. It highlighted the fact that the use of religions, all religions in one form or the other, to justify violence pointed to a single painful truth: Religion is too often misused for political purpose. Such misuse is made possible by a propensity on the part of some towards extremism. In this way, extremism is harnessed not for religious purpose but for political purpose.

Perhaps it was more important then to understand why extremism existed.

Exploring this notion, I asked the academic whether he could agree that it was extremism, as opposed to religion, that led to violence. He was gracious enough to agree, conceding the point immediately. He also agreed to the suggestion that in allowing for diversity, religions were not monolithic. This, he further conceded, disallowed any generalizations about any particular religion.

Muslim participants were quick to agree as well. I believe their willingness lay in recognition of the fact that the violence we have seen done in the name of Islam - from effigy-burning to death threats to killings to terrorism - cannot by any stretch of the imagination be seen as being definitive or characteristic of Islam.

This agreement was echoed by other participants from different backgrounds, some completely secular or atheistic. Discussing the matter further, the workshop very quickly agreed that extremism was largely caused by factors that were independent of religion. Core amongst these are poverty, a lack of education and the denial of social justice. These factors have allowed for the entrenching, and misuse, of extremist thought and the galvanizing of extremist action.

Recognising this, the workshop readily agreed that the fight against extremism was one that had to focus, as a global concern, on eradicating the root causes of extremism.

The workshop ended on a high note, its recommendations a testament to the fact that more often than not, so many of us are shackled by fear and prejudice. Constructive and meaningful dialogue, and the truths it bears, can be achieved where there is the will to do so.

MIS