Distilling it to its essence, Karpal Singh is being prosecuted for stating a legal opinion and for indicating an intention to seek remedy from a court for his clients.
I was in court yesterday and had the benefit of hearing the charge read out to him. The charge of sedition is in respect of certain statements made during a press conference on 12th February 2009, held just after the Perak controversy erupted. These statements included the following excerpts reproduced by Malaysiakini:
"The allegedly seditious statement read out this morning was from a partial transcript of a press conference held at the law firm, during which Karpal had said Sultan Azlan Shah could be taken to court in his official capacity for authorising the removal of Pakatan Rakyat Perak Menteri Besar Mohd Nizar Jamaluddin.
Based on the underlined parts of the transcript, Karpal is alleged to have said: ‘With that ruling of the federal court which has stood the test of time for 32 years, beyond a pale of a doubt, the Sultan of Perak has contravened Article 16(6) of the constitution of the state of Perak.
‘In my view, until such time the assembly has invoked the provision of Article 33(1), both Mohd Osman Jailu and Jamaludin Mohd Radzi remained PKR assemblymen, together with Jelapang assemblywoman Hee Yit Foong remaining with the DAP until her resignation letter was subjected to determination by the assembly pursuant to Article 33(1), thereby causing the Pakatan Rakyat to have 31 members in the assembly of 60 members.
‘It cannot therefore be said that the Sultan of Perak acted intra vires (when) in fact (he) acted ultra vires Article 16(6) when he determined that Menteri Besar (Mohd) Nizar Jamaludin had ceased to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the legislative assembly and was therefore required to tender resignation of the executive council over which he presided including his own resignation.
‘Clearly the Sultan of Perak cannot invoke his powers under Article 16(1) which states [His Royal Highness shall appoint an Executive Council] to appoint a Barisan Nasional executive council with a new menteri besar and a new government. The government of Menteri Besar Nizar Jamaludin still had constitutional supremacy and legitimacy. The actions of the Sultan of Perak are clearly premature.’
These statements give a sense of the nature of what Karpal said and of what the senior lawyer was trying to communicate. It would not be unreasonable to say that the nature of his observations was similar to that of the numerous opinions on the issue that were published at the time.
It is true that Karpal did go on to speak about the remedies that Nizar could see and explained that these could and would be procured by way of an action againt His Highness, Sultan Azlan Shah. Karpal however explained why this was so and pointed to precedent in the course of his explaining his position.
Looking at this in the objective and unemotional way that one assumes the authorities did, it seems that the State will no longer tolerate any expression of opinion concerning the Rulers, and presumably the other matters with which the offence of sedition is concerned. In this regard, section 3(1) of the Sedition Act defines a “seditious tendency” as a tendency:
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler or against any Government;
(b) to excite the subjects of any Ruler or the inhabitants of any territory governed by any Government to attempt to procure in the territory of the Ruler or governed by the Government, the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any matter as by law established;
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the administration of justice in Malaysia or in any State;
(d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the subjects of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or of the Ruler of any State or amongst the inhabitants of Malaysia or of any State;
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia; or
(f) to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the Federal Constitution.
The impact of the decision to prosecute is yet to be fully understood, in part because the charge did not explain the seditious tendency that is the foundation of the charge. It does however appear that the prosecution case is founded on the statements having excited disaffection against His Highness, the Sultan or having questioned a matter of prerogative. Much has been said about the decision of the Sultan having been made pursuant to prerogative discretion.
How this will be reconciled with the proviso in section 3(2) is however not clear. This proviso reads as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) an act, speech, words, publication or other things shall not be deemed to be seditious by reason only that it has a tendency -
(a) to show that any Ruler has been misled or mistaken in any of his measures;
(b) to point out errors or defects in any Government or constitution as by law established (except in respect of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative referred to in subsection (1)(f) otherwise than in relation to the implementation of any provision relating thereto) or in legislation or in the administration of justice with a view to the remedying of the errors or defects;
(c) except in respect of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative referred to in subsection (1)(f) -
(i) to persuade the subjects of any Ruler or the inhabitants of any territory governed by any Government to attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration of any matter in the territory of such Government as by law established; or
(ii) to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters producing or having a tendency to produce feelings of illwill and enmity between different races or classes of the population of the Federation,
if the act, speech, words, publication or other thing has not otherwise in fact a seditious tendency.
I recognize that the State has a duty to ensure the freedom to express is not abused. The right of the State to intervene is however limited to where intervention, and this must be by way of federal law, is necessary in the interests of democracy. Where this is the case, the extent of the intervention must be proportional to the threat that is sought to be dealt with. What this means is that the State cannot erect a complete barrier to expression, a state of affairs that the legislature recognized in enacting the proviso in section 3(2). Expression on sensitive issues is essential in certain circumstances.
The prosecution does not appear to have an easy case on its hands. It must show that Karpal's statements did disclose a seditious tendency and, if so, did not fall within the ambit of the proviso. From comments made by Karpal that have been carried by the media, it appears that he is not too worried in view of the way the sections are to be understood and applied. Seen from this perspective, it may be premature to say that the freedom of expression has been curtailed; a court is yet to make a decision on the subject.
Having said that, the decision to prosecute Karpal will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on free speech. Many will think that if Karpal could be prosecuted for stating a legal opinion, then it is possible that others may be charged for less. Against a backdrop of other individuals being charged for comments left on internet site, this would not be an unreasonable conclusion.
I was in court yesterday and had the benefit of hearing the charge read out to him. The charge of sedition is in respect of certain statements made during a press conference on 12th February 2009, held just after the Perak controversy erupted. These statements included the following excerpts reproduced by Malaysiakini:
"The allegedly seditious statement read out this morning was from a partial transcript of a press conference held at the law firm, during which Karpal had said Sultan Azlan Shah could be taken to court in his official capacity for authorising the removal of Pakatan Rakyat Perak Menteri Besar Mohd Nizar Jamaluddin.
Based on the underlined parts of the transcript, Karpal is alleged to have said: ‘With that ruling of the federal court which has stood the test of time for 32 years, beyond a pale of a doubt, the Sultan of Perak has contravened Article 16(6) of the constitution of the state of Perak.
‘In my view, until such time the assembly has invoked the provision of Article 33(1), both Mohd Osman Jailu and Jamaludin Mohd Radzi remained PKR assemblymen, together with Jelapang assemblywoman Hee Yit Foong remaining with the DAP until her resignation letter was subjected to determination by the assembly pursuant to Article 33(1), thereby causing the Pakatan Rakyat to have 31 members in the assembly of 60 members.
‘It cannot therefore be said that the Sultan of Perak acted intra vires (when) in fact (he) acted ultra vires Article 16(6) when he determined that Menteri Besar (Mohd) Nizar Jamaludin had ceased to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the legislative assembly and was therefore required to tender resignation of the executive council over which he presided including his own resignation.
‘Clearly the Sultan of Perak cannot invoke his powers under Article 16(1) which states [His Royal Highness shall appoint an Executive Council] to appoint a Barisan Nasional executive council with a new menteri besar and a new government. The government of Menteri Besar Nizar Jamaludin still had constitutional supremacy and legitimacy. The actions of the Sultan of Perak are clearly premature.’
These statements give a sense of the nature of what Karpal said and of what the senior lawyer was trying to communicate. It would not be unreasonable to say that the nature of his observations was similar to that of the numerous opinions on the issue that were published at the time.
It is true that Karpal did go on to speak about the remedies that Nizar could see and explained that these could and would be procured by way of an action againt His Highness, Sultan Azlan Shah. Karpal however explained why this was so and pointed to precedent in the course of his explaining his position.
Looking at this in the objective and unemotional way that one assumes the authorities did, it seems that the State will no longer tolerate any expression of opinion concerning the Rulers, and presumably the other matters with which the offence of sedition is concerned. In this regard, section 3(1) of the Sedition Act defines a “seditious tendency” as a tendency:
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler or against any Government;
(b) to excite the subjects of any Ruler or the inhabitants of any territory governed by any Government to attempt to procure in the territory of the Ruler or governed by the Government, the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any matter as by law established;
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the administration of justice in Malaysia or in any State;
(d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the subjects of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or of the Ruler of any State or amongst the inhabitants of Malaysia or of any State;
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia; or
(f) to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III of the Federal Constitution or Article 152, 153 or 181 of the Federal Constitution.
The impact of the decision to prosecute is yet to be fully understood, in part because the charge did not explain the seditious tendency that is the foundation of the charge. It does however appear that the prosecution case is founded on the statements having excited disaffection against His Highness, the Sultan or having questioned a matter of prerogative. Much has been said about the decision of the Sultan having been made pursuant to prerogative discretion.
How this will be reconciled with the proviso in section 3(2) is however not clear. This proviso reads as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) an act, speech, words, publication or other things shall not be deemed to be seditious by reason only that it has a tendency -
(a) to show that any Ruler has been misled or mistaken in any of his measures;
(b) to point out errors or defects in any Government or constitution as by law established (except in respect of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative referred to in subsection (1)(f) otherwise than in relation to the implementation of any provision relating thereto) or in legislation or in the administration of justice with a view to the remedying of the errors or defects;
(c) except in respect of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative referred to in subsection (1)(f) -
(i) to persuade the subjects of any Ruler or the inhabitants of any territory governed by any Government to attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration of any matter in the territory of such Government as by law established; or
(ii) to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters producing or having a tendency to produce feelings of illwill and enmity between different races or classes of the population of the Federation,
if the act, speech, words, publication or other thing has not otherwise in fact a seditious tendency.
I recognize that the State has a duty to ensure the freedom to express is not abused. The right of the State to intervene is however limited to where intervention, and this must be by way of federal law, is necessary in the interests of democracy. Where this is the case, the extent of the intervention must be proportional to the threat that is sought to be dealt with. What this means is that the State cannot erect a complete barrier to expression, a state of affairs that the legislature recognized in enacting the proviso in section 3(2). Expression on sensitive issues is essential in certain circumstances.
The prosecution does not appear to have an easy case on its hands. It must show that Karpal's statements did disclose a seditious tendency and, if so, did not fall within the ambit of the proviso. From comments made by Karpal that have been carried by the media, it appears that he is not too worried in view of the way the sections are to be understood and applied. Seen from this perspective, it may be premature to say that the freedom of expression has been curtailed; a court is yet to make a decision on the subject.
Having said that, the decision to prosecute Karpal will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on free speech. Many will think that if Karpal could be prosecuted for stating a legal opinion, then it is possible that others may be charged for less. Against a backdrop of other individuals being charged for comments left on internet site, this would not be an unreasonable conclusion.
MIS
